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The defense of a naval ship berthed in a harbor is a complex task affected by 
many factors. These include the fishing vessel density close to the ship and the challenge 
of discriminating neutral vessels from threats. A naval vessel berthed at harbor is more 
susceptible to attack than a vessel in open seas. The chances of detecting and countering a 
terrorist boat vary widely depending on several factors, including early identification of 
the attack and weapons available. 
This research uses modeling in Map Aware Non-uniform Automata (MANA) to 
analyze the protection measures adopted by naval vessels against terrorist boats. Design 
of experiments is used to efficiently generate data, which is then replicated using high-
performance computing, to address a wide range of possibilities and outcomes. The data 
generated is analyzed using a variety of techniques. The study concludes that lethality of 
Blue weapons is the most important factor in determining Blue’s ability to counter a Red 
suicide boat attack. Additionally, the tactic of firing a warning shot followed by disabling 
shots within the exclusion zone decreases Blue’s success probability. Finally, an 
exclusion zone of at least 60 meters that is enforced with a patrol boat is recommended. 
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The reader is cautioned that the computer programs presented in this research may 
not have been exercised for all cases of interest. While every effort has been made, within 
the time available, to ensure that the programs are free of computational and logical 
errors, they cannot be considered validated. Any application of these programs without 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The 12th of October 2000 is a day to be remembered by the whole world. On that 
day terrorists carried out a suicide boat attack on USS Cole while it was berthed in the 
Port of Aden. The attack was a major incident that generated many questions, including 
reconsidering tactics regarding ship protection. Since then, ship protection and force 
protection has been an important aspect for any warship—be it in harbor or at sea. Many 
defensive tactics are developed, tested, implemented, and are being improved upon each 
day.  
When naval ships are berthed in a naval port, ship protection is often not a big 
concern for the ship’s staff as there will be no or only controlled civilian vessels moving 
around the ship or in the harbor. However, when warships are berthed in a port that is 
under civilian control, or when the ship is on a goodwill or flag hoisting mission to 
another country, then the ships are berthed in a civilian port where there is a lot of nearby 
civilian vessel activity in the form of fishing vessels, cargo dhows, and recreational boats. 
When this occurs, ship protection is a real concern for the ship’s staff. As per the threat 
level enforced, the ship maintains appropriate protection levels and posts armed sentries 
to thwart any untoward incident. 
In order to analyze the action and protection measures adopted by a naval ship 
against terrorist boats, the following research objectives were identified to guide this 
research: 
• Determine which weapons systems, how many of them, and what
accompanying tactics are required to ensure successful defense of naval
vessels berthed at harbor.
• Explore the probability of successful ship defense as a function of the
number, type, and effectiveness of weapons used against different
numbers and tactics of the threat.
To begin this research a baseline scenario was developed for a warship berthed at 
harbor with three sentries posted with weapons on board ship facing seaward. An 
exclusion zone around the ship on its seaward side is established. No boat is allowed in 
this area unless positively identified. An armed boat patrols the area at the fringes of the 
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exclusion zone. The task of this patrol boat is to ensure that no boat/vessel enters the 
exclusion zone. If the patrol finds a potentially threatening boat heading towards the 
exclusion zone, then it will intercept the threat and will direct that vessel to avoid the 
exclusion zone using non-lethal means, such as a whistle, bright light, or verbal warning. 
If an incoming boat is found to be non-compliant to the instructions, then the patrol boat 
will raise an alarm informing all sentries onboard the ship and patrol boat of the threat. 
The sentries are then allowed to fire disabling rounds as soon as the incoming boat enters 
the exclusion zone. The sentries have been ordered to ensure that no incoming boat is 
able to reach within five meters of the ship using whatever means they have to in order to 
stop the threat. 
In this scenario Blue is able to achieve successful defense if all Red boats are 
destroyed before hitting the ship’s side. If one or more Red boats are able to reach their 
target, then Red has achieved its mission and it’s a failure for Blue. To explore the 
effectiveness of ship self-defense measures, a simulation of this tactical situation was 
developed using the agent-based modeling environment Map Aware Non-uniform 
Automata (MANA) (McIntosh, 2007). Many different scenarios were studied by 
efficiently varying inputs to the model in many possible combinations. 
After the scenario was built, the next step was to apply design of experiments 
(DOE) to efficiently explore the model over a range of controllable and uncontrollable 
factors. Using different factor combinations, different scenarios were generated varying 
the number of Red boats, exclusion zone distance, number of sentries, probability of hit 
of Blue agents, speed of Red boats, and the number of shots taken by a Red boat before it 
sinks (i.e., its staying power). These factors were used in a Nearly Orthogonal Latin 
Hypercube (NOLH) design to obtain 257 space-filling design points. As the design points 
were obtained by a NOLH, the maximum absolute pairwise correlation between any two 
factors was 0.058. These 257 design points were crossed with eight levels of weapon 
combinations for Blue sentries and two-levels of the number of Blue patrol boats to 
obtain 4,112 unique design points. Using the cluster computers in the Simulation 
Experiments & Efficient Design (SEED) lab, each design point was replicated 100 times, 
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for a total of 411,200 simulated terrorist attacks on a warship berthed at harbor. The 
output was analyzed to obtain insight on the thesis research objectives above. 
Different analysis techniques, such as regression models, partition trees, 
histograms, and ANOVA were used to analyze the data generated by the simulation 
experiments. The following important insights were obtained: 
• The most important factor to defend a ship is the lethality of Blue weapons 
against the Red boat. In simple words, the type of weapons the sentries 
used is the most important factor in protecting the ship. There was a clear 
distinction among the results when the Red boat was able to sustain 
against Blue weapons and when it was not able to do so. 
• Another important factor is the probability of hit by Blue sentries—i.e., 
their skill level.  
• The presence of the Blue patrol boat and the speed of the Red boat also 
emerged as important factors. In almost all scenarios, the Blue patrol boat 
played an important part in ensuring a successful defense.  
• The probability of successful defense is reduced when multiple Red boats 
attacked simultaneously, but it was not a major factor. 
• Exclusion zone distance also played an important role in ensuring 
successful defense of the Blue ship. An exclusion zone of at least 60 
meters is recommended to be maintained by the Blue force. 
• It was also found that sentries should fire on the Red boat as soon as they 
enter the exclusion zone. Delivering a warning shot followed by a 
disabling shot will substantially reduce Blue’s success probability. 
 
References 
McIntosh, G.C. (2007). MANA version 4 user manual. Auckland, New Zealand: Defence 
Technology Agency. 
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“On October 12, 2000, suicide terrorists exploded a small boat alongside the USS 
Cole, as it was refueling in the Yemeni port of Aden. The blast ripped a 40-foot-wide 
hole near the waterline of the Cole, killing 17 American sailors and injuring 39 others” 
(FBI, 2005). This suicide attack severely damaged the ship. It had to be towed to another 
location for necessary repairs in order to make it sea worthy again. Force Protection Plan 
Bravo was enforced onboard USS Cole at that time. This terrorist attack raised a series of 
questions regarding the efficacy and implementation of the force protection plan. Since 
that event, ship protection procedures have changed a lot. Navies around the globe have 
reviewed their protection plans and tactics, and tried to implement such plans in practice. 
Many changes were made in tactics and different standard operating procedures (SOPs) 
were devised. With every passing day improvements are being incorporated in these 
SOPs to ensure a reliable defense of naval vessels at sea and at harbor. 
When a naval vessel is berthed at harbor within a home country, it is generally 
berthed at a naval harbor (that is, the harbor is controlled by the Navy). In a naval harbor, 
there is controlled movement of all vessels, and any vessel moving in close proximity of 
naval ships is well identified, so the chances of a terrorist suicide attack are low. 
However, when ships are berthed in a civilian controlled port or when warships pay 
goodwill or flag hoisting visits to other countries, then naval ships are generally berthed 
at a commercial jetty in a civilian port. Standard procedure is that an exclusion zone of 40 
meters to 70 meters, depending on the space available, is established by the local host 
nation. No vessel is allowed to enter this exclusion zone, and an armed boat patrols this 
area to avoid a breach of this exclusion zone. It is the responsibility of this patrol boat to 
intercept any vessel moving towards the exclusion zone and direct them away from it, 
using non-lethal means, for example, whistles, bright lights, and radios. However, if any 
boat does not alter its course and continues to move towards the exclusion zone, then the 
vessel is believed to be hostile. In such a situation, the patrol boat alerts all sentries 
onboard the ship, and sentries are allowed to fire disabling shots on the boat entering the 
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exclusion zone. The number and type of weapons manned by the sentries depends on the 
threat level enforced at that time. Outside this exclusion zone, normal harbor traffic runs, 
including fishing boats, recreation boats, or cargo dhows. From this traffic, if there are 
one or more terrorist boats that alter their course to hit the side of the naval ship, then 
only sentries with small arms are available to defend against the attack. At that time, the 
probability of successful defense will mainly depend on the alertness of the sentries, the 
probability of hit by weapons carried by sentries, training of sentries, and the lethality of 
the weapons. To ensure an acceptable level of successful defense, the number and type of 
weapons by sentries, along with the width of exclusion zone, must be known by the 
ship’s crew at all times.  
B. OBJECTIVE 
The goal of this thesis is to determine whether the standard procedures and 
weapons that are currently in place can ensure a successful defense of a naval vessel 
berthed at a civilian harbor. In addition, it explores which weapon systems and how many 
of them, as well as accompanying tactics, are required to ensure a successful defense of a 
naval vessel berthed at harbor. Here, “tactics” means the width of the exclusion zone, 
whether sentries should fire immediately on any vessel entering the exclusion zone, or 
whether they should first fire a warning shot and then disabling shots. This thesis also 
explores the probability of successful defense when the number and combinations of 
weapons is changed alongside the width of exclusion zone. 
C. SCOPE OF THESIS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research focuses on tactical level scenarios in which a naval vessel is berthed 
at harbor. The threat level is high and it is believed that a suicide attack may be 
imminent. The ship is utilizing three sentries with weapons, and one armed patrol boat is 
maintaining an exclusion zone around ship. The objective of these defensive forces is to 
thwart any suicide attack in the form of suicide boats. The primary research question 
guiding this thesis research is: 
• What type of and how many weapons are required to ensure the successful 
defense of a berthed ship against a terrorist suicide boat? 
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Supporting questions are as follows: 
• What should be the width of the exclusion zone with different weapon 
combinations? 
• What accompanying tactics are required to ensure the defense of the ship? 
• If the number of weapons, type of weapons, or width of the exclusion zone 
is changed, how does it impact the probability of successful defense by the 
Blue ship? 
D. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The information about the capabilities of the Blue force, i.e., the weapons held by 
the sentries and their characteristics, is provided in Chapter II. A general literature review 
about important terms and methods used during this thesis are also explained in this 
chapter. Chapter III provides an overview of the methodology adapted for the research. In 
addition, this chapter also explains the agent-based modeling environment Map Aware 
Non-uniform Automata (MANA) that is used for simulating the scenario. Chapter IV 
describes the efficient design of experiments (DOE) techniques used to explore the model 
to answer the research questions. Chapter V presents an analysis of the data obtained 
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II. CAPABILITIES, SCENARIO DESCRIPTION, AND 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter describes the capabilities and characteristics of different weapons 
held by Blue units. It also describes the operational setting used to calculate the measure 
of effectiveness (MOE), i.e., the probability of successful defense by Blue. In addition, 
this chapter discusses important concepts and methods used during this study. 
A. BLUE UNIT’S RESOURCES AND CAPABILITIES 
Sentries onboard ships are posted as per the threat level enforced. The strength of 
these sentries and the weapons carried by them depends on the threat level. If the threat 
level is high, sentries are required to man big caliber guns and the number of sentries will 
increase. Threat level is issued via shore authorities and the ship has no control over it. A 
ship may take measures as per the threat level enforced, or if deemed appropriate by the 
commanding officer, as per one level above the level promulgated. The following are the 
type of guns carried/manned by sentries: 
• 7.62mm G3/M16 
• 7.62mm LMG 
• 12.7mm Gun 
1. 7.62mm G3 / 5.56mm M-16 
Sentries armed with assault rifles are deployed if the threat level is low or it is 
considered that no attack will occur without adequate warning. The two types of assault 
rifles being considered here are the G3A3 and M16A4 (see Figure 1), respectively. Table 






Table 1.   Assault Rifle General Characteristics. Adapted from “Automatic 
rifle G3A3 & G3P4” (n.d.), Powers (2016). 
Rifle Country ROF Magazine Capacity 
7.62 mm G3A3 Pakistan 500–600 rpm 20 rounds 
5.56 mm M16A4 U.S. 700–750 rpm 30 rounds 
 
 
Figure 1.  Assault Rifles G3A3 and M16A4. Source: “Assault Rifle G3” 
(n.d.), “M16A4” (n.d.) 
2. 7.62mm Light Machine Gun LMG MG1A3 
Another potential weapon manned is the 7.62mm machine gun. “The MG3 
(MG1A3) is an open, fully automatic weapon for sustained firing and firing in bursts. It is 
a ‘recoil-operated weapon’ in which the recoil forces are used to feed and load the 
cartridges and to extract and eject the spent cartridge cases” (“Machine Gun MG3 
(MG1A3)”, n.d.). It is a highly effective weapon in terms of its rate of fire (ROF) and 
ammunition capacity. Table 2 depicts general characteristics of a 7.62mm LMG. 
Table 2.   Light Machine Gun Characteristics. Adapted from “Machine Gun 
MG3 (MG1A3)” (n.d.), “M240” (n.d.). 
Weapon Country ROF Magazine Capacity 
7.62 mm MG1A3 Pakistan 1000–1300 rpm 250 rounds 
7.62 mm Browning M240 U.S. 650–1000 200 rounds 
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The two different types of machine guns, whose characteristics are given in Table 
2, are depicted in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.  Browning M240 (U.S.) and LMG MG1A3 (Pakistan), Source: 
“Machine Gun MG3 (MG1A3)” (n.d.), “M240” (n.d.). 
3. 12.7mm Gun 
A 12.7 mm gun is an automatic weapon that employs 12.7 mm armor piercing 
(AP), armor piercing incendiary (API), and hard core ammunition. It is very effective 
against low flying aircraft and ground targets, especially armored vehicles (“Anti-Aircraft 
Machine Gun 12.7 MM TYPE 54,” n.d.). Therefore, it can be considered the most 
effective weapon against incoming suicide boats, especially if the aim is to destroy and 
sink the boat. Table 3 depicts the general characteristics of two types of 12.7 mm guns. 
Table 3.   12.7mm Machine Gun Characteristics. Adapted from “Anti-
Aircraft Machine Gun 12.7 MM TYPE 54” (n.d.), 
“Browning M2” (n.d.). 




12.7mm gun Pakistan 600 rpm 70 rounds 15mm at 500 m 
12.7mm Browning 
M2 (HMG) 
U.S. 500 rpm 110 rounds 15mm at 500 m 
 
Figure 3 depicts the 12.7 mm machine guns used onboard ships by the Pakistan 
Navy and U.S. Navy. 
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Figure 3.  12.7mm Gun. Source: “Anti-Aircraft Machine Gun 12.7 MM 
TYPE 54” (n.d.), “Browning 12.7mm” (n.d.). 
B. SCENARIO 
A general depiction of the scenario we analyze is given in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4.  General Depiction of Scenario. 
 
 9 
Figure 4 shows a Blue ship berthed at a civilian harbor. The threat level is high, so 
three armed sentries are deployed onboard the ship. In addition to these sentries, one 
patrol boat is also patrolling in the area. The purpose of this boat is to ensure that no 
threat boat is able to reach the ship. To ensure this, an exclusion zone of 50 meters is 
established seaward side of the ship and no unidentified boat is allowed to enter in this 
area. If any boat tries to force her way towards the ship and enters the exclusion zone, 
then all sentries are allowed to fire on the threat boat until it is neutralized. Outside the 
exclusion zone, normal harbor traffic is allowed, including cargo dhows, recreational 
boats, and fishing vessels. The Red force consists of one or two Red explosive-laden 
suicide boats, which are not identified until these boats try to force their way towards the 
ship and enter the exclusion zone. It is assumed that as soon as any Red boat alters her 
course towards the ship, she will increase her speed to maximum and try to ram her boat 
into the side of the Blue ship. The Red boat is successful if any one or all of the Red 
boats are able to reach the ship’s side (i.e., Red successfully rams boats into the Blue 
ship). The Blue force is successful if all Red boats are neutralized before they were able 
to reach their target. 
C. CIRCULATION MODEL 
Defense of naval ships in harbor is best explained by the half leg of a circulation 
model. Defensive weapons on the ship and patrol boats are not the only available 
defensive arrangement for the ship; rather the ship’s defense is a tiered operation, and 
sentries and patrol boats are the last tier of its defense. Another important tier is the 
“harbor protection organization.” The purpose of this study is to analyze the last tier of 
the ship’s defense. This last tier becomes particularly important when the ship is berthed 
in a foreign port where we do not control, have much information, or trust on other tiers. 
The circulation model is explained in ensuing paragraphs. 
Let’s say a terrorist leaves his base to attack a naval ship in harbor. After he gets 
into the water with an explosives-laden boat, he is expected to encounter two main tiers 
of defense. Each of the tiers has its own factors and players which will define the 
effectiveness of that tier in stopping the terrorist. These tiers will each have their own 
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probability of detection/hunting the terrorist and similarly the terrorist will have his 
survival probability from each tier. In this model we assume independence of these two 
tiers, although in reality they can be somewhat dependent depending on the coordination 
between harbor security and ship security. This concept is illustrated in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5.  Circulation Model for Terrorist Survival. 
ph = probability (terrorist neutralized by harbor defense personnel). 
ps = probability (terrorist is neutralized by ship based/patrol boat sentries). 
qh = probability (terrorist is not neutralized by harbor patrol defense) = survival 
probability of terrorist from harbor defense personnel = 1 – ph. 
qs = probability (terrorist is not neutralized by ship based defense) = survival 
probability of terrorist against ship based defense = 1 − ps. 
The aggregate survival probability of a terrorist for a successful attack on the ship 
is q, which can be calculated as: 
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q = qh × qs 
So, q is one of two parts of the survival probability of the terrorist. As we are considering 
a suicide boat mission against the ship, the other part of the circulation model is not 
important, thereby the whole model can be viewed as a half circulation model, which 
simplifies to a Bernoulli distribution. 
Let us suppose each tier has a probability of neutralizing the terrorist of 0.6; then, 
for a terrorist we have qh = qs = (1 − 0.6) = 0.4, which means that the terrorist has 40% 
chance of survival at each stage. Then, the cumulative probability that a terrorist can have 
a successful attack on a ship berthed at harbor can be calculated as: 
q = qh × qs = 0.4 × 0.4 = 0.16, 
which means that each terrorist has a 16% chance that he will be successful, assuming 
independence between all events. The probability of his success can be reduced by 
increasing the probability to neutralize the terrorist at any one or all of the stages. If the 
probability of intercepting the threat is increased by 0.1 at each stage, then the chances of 
success for a terrorist decreases drastically and it comes down to 9%. If ships are berthed 
at a home port, then ph is important. However, if the ship is in a foreign port, then ps (the 
probability of terrorist neutralization by the ship) becomes very important. At that time, it 
becomes very important for the ship’s Commanding Officer to increase ps as much as 
possible to decrease the terrorist’s probability of success. 
D. EXPLOSIVES USED IN SUICIDE BOATS 
There are hundreds of types of explosives used by terrorists. The explosives may 
be stable and not explode even if someone shoots at it or even sets it on fire. In other 
cases, the explosive can be very sensitive to fire or a bullet hit. Although it may be true in 
rare cases that explosives are sensitive, generally it is not true. Explosives that terrorists 
generally use are inert and are not affected even if they are sprayed with bullets. 
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1. Categories of Explosives 
There are hundreds of formulas and compounds of explosive materials. 
Explosives can consist of a chemically pure compound, such as nitroglycerin, or a 
mixture of a catalyst fuel and oxidizer mixture, such as black powder (Peters, Tanner, & 
Kasper, 2010). The United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives 
(ATF) categorizes explosives into three types. 
a. Low Explosives 
Low explosives deflagrate, meaning, they combust at much slower rates, thereby 
giving a reaction of a burst or flair of flame (Peters et al., 2010). Most fireworks fall into 
this category. These explosives are primarily used as a propellant to push an object. 
However, when low explosives are packed in a container, then natural forces of physics 
come in play and these explosives can be very dangerous and can detonate like high 
explosives. 
b. High Explosives 
High explosives are those that are generally used for commercial applications like 
demolition, mining, and military uses (Peters et al., 2010). These explosives can be 
initiated using a blasting cap, which sends a shock wave into the explosive to cause it to 
burn. The burn rate of high explosives is very high. It causes more destruction as a shock 
wave is generated due to its high burn rate. 
c. Blasting Agents 
Blasting agents are a mix of fuel and oxidizer that produce a high pressure 
shockwave when detonated (Peters et al., 2010). On their own they cannot be ignited or 
burned, as they require a more sensitive high explosive booster to set them off.  
2. Explosives Generally Used by Terrorists 
When not in custody of gunpowder, terrorists often resort to improvisation to 
fulfill their evil deeds, by using improvised explosives. Generally available material, 
which is used as improvised explosives and is expected to be used by terrorists in urban 
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areas when gunpowder is not easily available, is inert and stable. The following is a list of 
generally used materials (there are many more as well) that can be used for making an 
improvised explosive device (IED) (Asthana & Nirmal, 2008): 
 
• Chlorate Mixtures 
• Flash Powders 
• Bangor (Firecracker Powder) 
• Permagnate Powder 
• Ammonium Nitrate and Aluminum Powder 
• Ammonium Nitrate Gel Explosives 
These are the chemical names of the main substances used for making IEDs, according to 
the fact sheet by National Academies and Department of Homeland Security (Department 
of Homeland Security, 2008). The fact sheet further explains: 
Many commonly available materials, such as fertilizer, gunpowder, and 
hydrogen peroxide, can be used as explosive materials in IEDs. Explosives 
must contain a fuel and an oxidizer, which provides the oxygen needed to 
sustain the reaction. A common example is ANFO, a mixture of 
ammonium nitrate, which acts as the oxidizer, and fuel oil (the fuel 
source). Concern about the use of explosives created from liquid 
components that can be transported in a stable form and mixed at the site 
of attack is the reason that in 2006 the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security restricted the amount of liquids that passengers can carry on 
commercial aircraft. (Department of Homeland Security, 2008) 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Various studies have addressed the defense of a naval ship against fast moving 
small boats; however, we mention three in particular that have used agent-based 
simulation to gain insight into tactical recommendations. 
The first study was a thesis done in June, 2011, by Lt Cdr Thomas Tsilis of the 
Hellenic Navy, at the Naval Postgraduate School. The author explored the key factors 
involved in escorting merchantmen through the Internationally Recommended Transit 
Corridor (IRTC) in the Gulf of Aden, as a defense against small pirate boats. He used 
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MANA and design of experiments to conclude that “convoys are most successful when 
they contain fewer than 14 merchant ships, travel at speeds greater than 18 knots, position 
the warship in front or on the flank of the convoy, and identify pirates at a range of no 
less than 4 kilometers” (Tsilis, 2011). 
The second study was conducted by Lisa R. Sickinger, Lieutenant, USN, in 2006. 
Her research was sponsored by the US Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate. LT 
Sickinger considered a naval warship’s defense against small boats while returning to a 
port and entering the harbor. The study’s main research question was “What non-lethal 
capabilities are required in a maritime force protection environment in order to 
effectively determine intent and/or deter suspicious small vessels?” (Sickinger, 2006). 
During the course of study Sickinger used Multi Agent Simulation (MAS) alongside 
efficient design of experiments and data farming techniques to explore and answer her 
research question. 
The third study, which is related to this thesis, was done by Felix Martinez 
Tiburcio, Lieutenant, Mexican Navy, in December 2005. Martinez analyzed the strategy 
developed by the Mexican Navy to prevent terrorist attacks on the strategic Campeche 
Sound (petroleum production area) in the Gulf of Mexico. Martinez used agent-based 
simulation, implemented in Map Aware Non-uniform Automata (MANA), and data 
farming to analyze and evaluate his research questions. From the study, Martinez 
concluded that “the most important threat factor in the scenarios is the speed of the 
enemy boats; and, with its broad surveillance and communication capabilities, the 
HAWKEYE is the most important Navy resource in the area” (Tiburcio, 2005). 
All three studies dealt with naval ships against terrorist boats/fast patrol boats by 
using agent-based simulation, data farming, and design of experiments in different 
scenarios. Leveraging this methodology, this study deals with a scenario in which a naval 
ship is berthed at harbor and all major systems of the ship are switched off, and thus, the 
defense of the ship is entirely dependent on the vigilance, alertness, and abilities of the 
sentries posted.   
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III. METHODOLOGY AND MODEL DESCRIPTION 
A. METHODOLOGY 
To carry out this study, an agent-based modeling platform known as Map Aware 
Non-Uniform Automata (MANA) was used to model different scenarios. By using 
MANA, the technique of data farming was used to generate data for subsequent analysis. 
Data farming is the process of using simulation and efficient design of experiments to 
“grow” output data, which can then be analyzed using data analysis and visualization 
techniques (Lucas, Kelton, Sanchez, Sanchez, & Anderson, 2015). After choosing factors 
and the ranges of these factors to explore, an efficient design of experiments (DOE) and 
cluster computing is used to computationally generate output data. This data is analyzed 
in order to identify significant factors, important thresholds, and to see whether 
interactions exist between key variables. After data collection, JMP statistical software is 
used to analyze the effectiveness of different weapons and tactics in protecting ships 
berthed at harbor. 
B. CALCULATION OF PROBABILITY OF HIT 
In order to analyze the protection measures of naval vessels berthed at harbor, it is 
important to calculate the probability of hit for all the weapons being carried by sentries. 
To calculate the probability of hit of a G3/12.7mm/7.62mm LMG, a small simulation 
using the ‘R’ language (https://www.r-project.org/) was run. To calculate the probability 
of hit (Phit) against a man-sized target, a target containing two rectangles, one on 
another, was considered. It is assumed that the driver of the boat is behind the wheel of 
the Red boat and a sentry has to hit the driver. It is also assumed that the driver’s upper 
body is visible and his legs are behind some structure. So, two rectangles, one on top of 
other, are considered to depict a man from some distance. The lower rectangle is 1.5 × 
2.5 feet and the upper rectangle is 1 × 1 feet. This is depicted in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6.  Depiction of Driver in the Form of Two Rectangles. 
To calculate the probability of hit of the weapons, this target was bombarded with 
1,000 simulated rounds having specified standard deviations in the x and y axes to 
represent weapon error. The aim-point of the bombardment was always the center of 
mass, with no aim point bias error. Although the exact values of the standard deviations 
in the x and y axis are unknown, but based on practical experience, standard deviations 
were estimated as a function of range. The values used were σx = 0.005×range and σy = 
0.005×range in meters. Then, the probability of hit, using the data from simulations run 
in “R,” was calculated out to 100 meters. Two different situations were simulated. First, 
the upper body of the boat driver is visible to the firer and the firer aims at the center of 
mass. In the second condition, it is simulated that boat driver has a shelter in front of him 
and only the head is visible, so any fire that is away from the upper rectangle (head) is 
counted as a miss. Figure 7 depicts the graph of the probability of hit, obtained when the 




Figure 7.  Probability of Hit of Small Arms versus Range (Meters). 
It is found that the probability of hit for all weapons is near one in both cases, if 
the weapon is to be fired at less than 60 meters (which is our main analysis area). 
However, this is the probability of hit by the weapon, not including the error induced by 
the shooter. The probability of hit by a shooter can be very different than the inherent 
probability of hit of the weapon. In an actual scenario, a lot of factors play a pivotal role 
in specifying the probability of hit, and these include, but are not limited to, the 
following: 
• The armed sentry knows that the approaching boat is a suicide boat, so 
fear may play a very big role. 
• Wind conditions at that time can cause inaccuracy of the shot. 
• Only 8–10 seconds are available for a sentry to aim, fire, and neutralize 
the threat, as a 12 knot boat will take 8–10 seconds to cross the exclusion 
zone and hit the ship. 
• The boat, and therefore the driver, is a moving target. 
• The sea state may cause the boat as well as sentries to move up and down 
with the water, hence making it difficult for the sentries to shoot 
accurately. 
All these factors and other conditions may be prevalent at that time, and could 
play a very important role in lowering the probability of hit of each weapon. Although no 
data is available to determine the probability of hit in such conditions, it is assumed that 
the probability of hit for individual rounds may decrease significantly.  
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If we consider that the probability of an individual round hitting the target reduces 
to 0.3, then the following is the calculation for multiple independent shots: 
• Probability of hit of an individual shot = p = 0.3. 
• Number of shots fired = n = 10. 
• Probability of at-least one successful shot = 1 − (1 − p)n = 0.9717. 
This calculation shows that even if an individual shot has a very low probability of hit, 
due to multiple shots being fired in burst mode by automatic weapons, the cumulative 
probability of hit increases very rapidly to one (assuming independence). We can see that 
within 10 rounds the probability of hit increases to near one. This means that in 
conditions such that the sentries are able to shoot several times, the terrorist will likely be 
neutralized. But, that’s the case when only one shot is enough to neutralize the terrorist. 
However, in most of the cases, the objective of sentries is not to neutralize the terrorist, 
but to neutralize the suicide boat, which may take far more shots before it is disabled. 
Keeping this in mind, the single shot probability of hit for these weapons was taken as a 
factor in the design of experiments (DOE), and it was varied from 0.2 to 0.8.  
C. MANA 
The modeling environment used to simulate the scenario is Map Aware Non-
Uniform Automata (MANA). MANA is a time-stepped, stochastic, agent-based 
distillation model developed by the Defense Technology Agency (DTA) of New Zealand. 
As the name suggests, the individual entities (agents) in MANA are “map aware,” which 
means that during the simulation individual entities’ situational awareness includes both 
terrain information and battle space activities. MANA incorporates several features not 
appearing in some other (simpler) cellular automaton combat models; for example, “the 
MANA model uses a ‘memory map’ to provide shared situational awareness and guide 




D. WHY WE USE AN AGENT-BASED MODEL 
According to Grimm and Railsback, “Agent-based models” can be defined as: 
An agent-based model (ABM) is one of a class of computational models 
for simulating the actions and interactions of autonomous agents (both 
individual and collective entities such as organizations or groups) with a 
view to assessing their effects on the system as a whole. It combines 
elements of game theory, complex systems, emergence, computational 
sociology, multi-agent systems, and evolutionary programming. Monte 
Carlo methods are used to introduce randomness. ABMs are also called 
individual-based models (IBMs). (Grimm & Railsback, 2005, p. 485)  
Agent-based models are the computational models of heterogeneous populations 
of agents and their interactions. It has always been a researcher’s goal to describe any 
processes or event with the most simple model and method that can explain that process 
with an acceptable degree of accuracy.  
The next question that comes to mind is: Why an agent- based model? In military 
applications, many different types of models are used to find the optimal solution of wide 
range of problems. It is best explained by Winston: 
Because of complexity, stochastic relations, and so on, not all real-word 
problems can be represented adequately in closed-formed models. 
Attempts to use analytical models for such systems usually require so 
many simplifying assumptions that the solutions are likely to be inferior or 
inadequate for implementation. Often, in such instances, the only 
alternative form of modeling and analysis available for the decision maker 
is simulation. (Winston, 2004) 
Agent-based modeling adds a new aspect to simulations of combat systems. It 
allows direct representation of individual battlefield entities and their interactions. We all 
know that all individuals are different. Even though in the military, uniformity in actions 
and responses is imparted via training and SOPs, it is still true that different individuals 
behave differently under varying circumstances and pressure. The varying responses 
reflect stochasticity on the part of individual entities. By using agent-based models, the 
essence of individual behavior is captured and by running stochastic simulations, a range 
of results is produced, which can help provide insight on possible outcomes of combat 
scenarios. 
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E. MODEL IMPLEMENTATION IN MANA 
After selecting MANA as the modeling environment and deciding on the details 
of the desired conceptual model, a base case scenario was developed. The following are 
some important aspects of MANA that were used to build the scenario. 
1. Battlefield 
The first thing to be done in MANA is to define the battlefield, as MANA 
recognizes different types of terrain. It is important to select the terrain according to the 
scenario when building the model. The user defines the battlefield area for a given 
scenario (McIntosh, 2007). Although there are different types of terrains available, we 
use the “Billiard Table” terrain, which affords maximum mobility and no concealment or 
protection. In this case, we simulate movement of Blue and Red entities on the water 
where no physical barrier hampers the movement, so the Billiard Table terrain type is 




Figure 8.  Edit Battlefield Tab. 
2. Squad 
Groupings of homogeneous (same initial behavioral and physical properties) are 
called “squads” in MANA. “Conceptually, a squad is a group of agents of any size 
(between 1 and 1,000), as defined by user. Agents in a squad share the same properties 
and can switch into different states depending on their circumstances” (McIntosh, 2007, 
p. 7). A MANA squad should not be confused with an infantry squad. Agents in a squad 
are defined based on their properties with respect to their weapons, characteristics, and 
behaviors. For the purpose of this model, five different type of squads were defined; three 
blue squads, one red squad and one neutral squad. To add or edit squad properties in 
MANA, the “Edit Squad Properties” tab in the setup menu is used. Different tabs within 
“Edit Squad Properties” are further explained in the following sections. 
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a. General 
On the General tab, several general properties of the squad are assigned, for 
example, the squad name, the number of agents in each squad, the initial orientation of 
the squad, and the fuel available to each member of the squad. General tab settings are 
illustrated in Figure 9. 
 




Under the Map tab, the initial position for every squad is set by specifying their 
home boxes. All squads will start from their assigned home box when the simulation run 
starts. Similarly, way points and a final destination for each squad are also given using 
the same tab (McIntosh, 2007). An illustration of the “Map” tab is given in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10.  Map Tab Used to Give Initial Start and Final Destination. 
c. Personalities 
The Personalities tab is very important, as it is used to define the behavior of 
individual squad members. Here, how an agent should behave in response to enemy, 
friends, and neutrals is defined. For example, the desires to move towards or away from 
an enemy, friend, or destination points, are defined here. Agents are given simple rules to 
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move on the battlefield depending on the location of other agents and conditions on the 
battlefield (McIntosh, 2007). Using the sliding bar, personality weightings for different 
actions are defined by the user. Other options available within this tab are illustrated in 
Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11.  Personality Tab Options. 
d. Tangibles 
Beside personality weightings, there are a number of tangible aspects or physical 
properties that can be defined under this tab. These include: 
• General properties such as allegiance, sensor height of agent, movement 
speed, and agent class 
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• Self-protection features, such as the number of hits to kill, concealment, 
and armor thickness 
• Waypoint radius (how close an agent has to be to a waypoint to be 
considered to have arrived at it) 
• Fuel consumption rate 
• Embussing behavior (determines when a “child” agent is to be released 
from a “parent” agent) 
This tab is depicted in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12.  Tangibles Tab for Describing Physical Properties of Squad. 
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e. Sensors 
The sensor model in MANA is intuitive and incorporates simple probabilistic 
calculations within the sensor range of each agent (McIntosh, 2007). In the sensor tab, we 
can assign range-probability pairs for detection and classification. Detection is knowing 
that “something” is present and classification is knowing whether the detected agent is a 
friend, enemy, or neutral. One other important property is that the user can also specify 
which class(es) of agents can be detected or classified by that particular sensor. An 
illustration of sensor tab is given in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13.  Sensors Tab. 
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f. Weapons 
Like sensors, weapons in MANA are also based on probabilistic calculations 
(McIntosh, 2007). Here, the user can assign primary and secondary weapons (up to four 
classes of weapons can be assigned) to a squad and the user can specify probabilities of 
hit for each bullet at different ranges. Also, the weapons carried by the squad can be 
classified as kinetic energy or high explosive. A screen shot of the Weapons tab is 
depicted in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14.  Weapons Tab. 
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g. Trigger State 
For a base MANA scenario, all the characteristics and behavior of squad/agents 
are first defined for each squad’s default state (McIntosh, 2007). For a simple scenario, 
this is all that may be required. But, for more complex scenarios, there may be a situation 
which warrants the behavior of an agent to change when certain conditions are fulfilled. 
For example, a squad may only be on a surveillance mission and is not allowed to fire on 
enemy agents until fired upon. In such situations, trigger states play a vital role. The user 
can also specify if an agent is forced into a trigger state, how long it will remain in the 
new state, and whether the agent will stay there, or return to its default state or any other 
new state. Figure 15 shows some of the trigger states available in MANA. 
 
Figure 15.  A Portion of the Trigger States Available to Agents in MANA. 
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h. Inter Squad SA/Intra Squad SA 
There are two situational awareness (SA) tabs, which are used to define 
communication within the squad as well as between different squads. The Intra Squad SA 
controls the flow of the situational awareness within a squad and does not vary with the 
trigger states; all of the agents in the simulation retain their original parameters. The Inter 
Squad SA controls the flow of situational awareness between different squads 
(McIntosh, 2007). 
i. Fuel 
Fuel capacity and consumption can be defined for each agent. Fuel can be used to 
represent a variety of quantities in study (food, batteries, endurance, etc.) and does not 
necessarily have to represent literal fuel. “Fuel” exchange can be used as a creative and 
symbolic interaction that might, for example, be used to trigger a state change. Examples 
of the creative use of fuel as given by the MANA manual are: 
• Recording accumulation of some trait such as courage, fatigue or 
discontent 
• Recording interactions with other agents, such as getting “close enough” 
to trigger a change 
• Modeling the logistic supply for some commodity 
F. ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATION OF MODELING IN MANA 
No software model can capture reality one hundred percent. Every model has its 
own unique limitations, and additionally, the user must also make certain assumptions 
while creating the scenario. The following are important limitations and assumptions with 
regard to the MANA model developed for this thesis: 
 
• When the sentry weapon probability of hit was varied as an input factor 
for the design of experiments, the probability of hit for all sentry weapons 
were changed together (lock-stepped) for one simulation run. In reality, 
different sentries will have different probabilities of hit. 
• In the MANA scenario, sentries are always alert and they start firing 
without any delay as soon as they become aware of a classified enemy. 
Also, as soon as a Red boat crosses the exclusion zone, sentries start firing 
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simultaneously. In an actual scenario, there may be a delay of few seconds 
and that too will vary from sentry to sentry. Some may have a delay of one 
second and some may have a delay of three seconds or even more. 
• In MANA weapons always fire. In reality, weapons may misfire. 
• In MANA, sensors either make a detection, or a classification, or neither. 
It is not possible to make an incorrect classification (for example, 
incorrectly classifying an enemy as a neutral or friend). 
• Battle damage assessment is instantaneous, and sentries never assess 
wrong. If Blue kills Red, he instantly knows it, and stops firing.  
• There is no coordinated targeting amongst Blue sentries. Blue sentries 
independently decide to fire or not, and do not take into consideration who 
the other sentries are firing at. Thus, two or more sentries may fire upon 
the same Red boat at the same time. This may or may not be desirable. It 
is an option, however, for one squad to have the “fire on closest targets” 
property activated, while another does not. 
• In this scenario, the fire rate, magazine size, and lethality of all weapons is 
the same. In reality, there may be variation in these. 
An annotated picture of MANA scenario is depicted in Figure 16. 
 
Figure 16.  Annotated Snapshot of the MANA Battle Scenario. 
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IV. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS
The more accurate the map, the more it resembles the territory. The most 
accurate map possible would be the territory, and thus would be perfectly 
accurate and perfectly useless. 
—Neil Gaiman, American Gods 
“One of the first things an experimenter or tester must do to design a good 
experiment is identify the experimental factors” (Sanchez & Wan, 2009, p. 61). In any 
process different factors may have a significant effect on that process and its output. 
These factors and their levels are used to determine the design for a particular 
experiment. A general way of exploring a process is to vary factors one at a time and 
observe how it affects the output of that process. However, it is not efficient or effective 
to vary factors one at a time. Factors may have an interaction between them, which 
means their effect on the output depends on the value of another factor, and without 
simultaneously varying the factors, their interactions can never be identified. Through 
design of experiments, the relationship between the input factors and output measure 
(response) can be explored in a systematic and effective way. According to Sanchez & 
Wan (2009), “if you are interested in exploring the behavior of a simulation model with 
more than a handful of input factors, efficient experimental designs are readily 
available—and much more powerful—than a petaflop supercomputer” (Sanchez & Wan, 
2009, p. 73). 
A. NEARLY ORTHOGONAL LATIN HYPERCUBE (NOLH) 
A very efficient proven way to design experiments is through the use of the Latin 
Hypercube (LHs). According to Sanchez & Wan (2009), “Latin hypercube designs 
provide a flexible way of constructing efficient designs for many quantitative factors. 
LHs have the appealing space-filling properties of factorial designs with fine grids, but 
require orders of magnitude less sampling” (p. 68). LH designs are very effective because 
of their efficiency, space-filling properties, and analysis flexibility.   
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In comparison to gridded designs, Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercubes (NOLHs) 
are very effective and provide better coverage. Efficient NOLH designs were constructed 
by Lucas and Cioppa in 2007 (Lucas & Cioppa, 2007). For modest numbers of factors, 
efficient NOLH designs have excellent space-filling and orthogonality properties. Despite 
their usefulness, Latin hypercubes are sometimes plagued with unacceptable correlation 
among input variables. Hernandez, Lucas, and Carlyle (2012) expanded the set of readily 
available NOLHs. They developed a mixed integer programming algorithm capable of 
generating Latin hypercubes with little or no correlation, thereby overcoming the problem 
of correlation among input variables (Hernandez, Lucas, & Carlyle, 2012). Near 
orthogonality in Latin hypercubes guarantees that the factors are not confounded; and 
space-filling guarantees that there are no large gaps in the exploration. Just to give an 
example: if we want to explore a model with four factors and each factor has two levels, 
then there will be 24 = 16 design points in a full factorial (all possible combinations) 
design. Alternatively, we can explore those four factors, each at more than two levels, 
using a catalogued NOLH design freely available via an Excel workbook that can be 
downloaded from https://harvest.nps.edu. The NOLH will give far better coverage and 
we can add up to three more factors without any additional sampling, and this can be 
accomplished with only 17 design points, only one more than the 16 design points 
required for the 2-level full factorial gridded design (see Figure 17 for a comparison).  
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Adapted from class notes in OA-4333, Simulation Analysis. 
Figure 17.  Comparison of Gridded Design and NOLH. 
B. EXPERIMENT FACTORS 
Based on our knowledge of the scenario and analysis goals, we vary the following 
factors in the DOE: 
• Probability of hit by Blue sentries 
• Number of Blue sentries 
• Number of Blue patrol boats 
• Blue sentry weapons configuration 
• Width of exclusion zone 
• Number of Red boats 
• Speed of Red boats after they enter the exclusion zone 
• Number of shots Red boats takes before being neutralized 
The ranges and levels for these factors are given in Tables 4, 5, and 6. Table 4 
lists the three weapon options available for the Blue sentries. 
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Table 4.   Blue Sentry Weapon Options. 
Weapon Type ROF  
(Rounds per minute) 
Magazine 
Capacity 
W1 (7.62mm gun) 500 20 
W2 (7.62mm Machine Gun) 1100 250 
W3 (12.7mm ) 600 70 
 
Table 5 gives the set of eight cases (options) for how the three Blue sentries are 
equipped with weapons. 
Table 5.   Possible Blue Sentry Weapons Configuration. 
Sentry 1 Sentry 2 Sentry 3 
W1 W2 W1 
W1 W2 --- (no weapon) 
W1 W3 --- (no weapon) 
W1 W2 W2 
W1 W3 W1 
W1 W3 W3 
W1 W2 W3 
W3 W2 W3 
 
Another important factor is the availability of a Blue patrol boat, so the two 
different levels for Blue patrol boat are zero and one, where one indicates that a boat is 
protecting the exclusion zone and zero indicates no Blue patrol boat. Besides the Weapon 
Configuration and Patrol Boat factors, the following six factors, in Table 6, were varied. 
These 6 total factors were explored using a 257 design point NOLH. 
Table 6.   The Other Six Factors with Ranges. 
No Variable Min Value Max Value 
1 Probability of hit 0.2 0.8 
2 Number of sentries (on ship) 2 3 
3 Number of Red boats 1 2 
4 Speed of Red boat after it the enters 
exclusion zone 
8 22 
5 Exclusion zone width (in steps of 10) 40 90 
6 Number of shots taken by Red boats before 
they are disabled 
1 25 
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The 257 design points NOLH for the above six factors gave a maximum absolute 
pairwise correlation of 0.058, which is only slightly above the desired target of .05, due 
to rounding for discrete factors. Figure 18 displays the pairwise correlations and pairwise 
scatter plots for the six factors.  
 
Figure 18.  Pairwise Correlation between 257 Design Points NOLH 
for 6 Factors. 
These 257 design points were then crossed with a full factorial for the eight levels of Blue 
sentry weapon configuration and the two levels for number of Blue patrol boats. This 
yielded a total of 4,112 final design points (8×2×257 = 4,112) for our experiment. These 
4,112 design points represent 4,112 different simulated conditions of an attack on a ship 
when it is berthed at harbor. Since MANA is stochastic, each of the design points was 
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replicated 100 times. The experiment was run on the Simulation Experiments and 
Efficient Designs (SEED) high performance cluster. With 160 available processors, the 
411,200 total runs were accomplished overnight. The SEED Center has also written a 
data postprocessor that gathers the MANA output data from the individual runs and 
places them into one file, together with the factor settings, facilitating easy loading and 
analysis into a statistical tool of choice, such as Excel or JMP. 
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V. ANALYSIS OF DATA 
This chapter uses statistical methods to analyze the data generated from the 
experiment discussed in the previous chapter. For the analysis, the JMP statistical 
package was the primary tool used (see www.jmp.com). We begin with an initial 
assessment of the data and move to a more detailed analysis using a variety of statistical 
methods. The primary output metric, our measure of effectiveness, is the probability Red 
is able to achieve its goal of reaching the ship. The objective is to determine the 
relationship between the input factors and the probability of the Red force achieving its 
goal. To quantify this relationship, linear regression and partition tree techniques were 
applied. Histograms and other plots were also used to explore the probability that the Red 
force is able to achieve its goal as a function of the input conditions.  
A. INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF DATA 
After the completion of the simulation runs, the MANA output was obtained in 
the form of a csv file, which contained 30 output columns and 411,200 rows—with one 
row for each of the 411,200 simulated attacks on a Blue ship by one or two Red boats. A 
snapshot of a portion of the output file is shown in Figure 19  
 
Figure 19.  Snapshot of Output File Obtained after Simulation Runs. 
Out of these 30 MANA columns in the obtained csv file, only nine columns are of 
importance for our analysis. Eight of the columns are the input factors and one column is 
our response—a binary variable for whether or not Red achieved its goal. All of the rows 
of data for these nine columns were placed in a separate file for analysis. This file was 
Identifier ProbHit RedBoatSpRedBtHits WpnCase NumBlueSNumBluePExclusion  NumRedB Run Seed Alleg1Cas(Alleg2Cas(Alleg0Cas(Blue Reach Red Reach Neutral Re  Steps
I0E0 0.44 20 15 1 3 0 70 2 1 3.14E+08 0 0 0 No Yes No 49
I0E0 0.44 20 15 1 3 0 70 2 2 5.96E+08 0 0 0 No Yes No 34
I0E0 0.44 20 15 1 3 0 70 2 3 -1.1E+08 0 0 0 No Yes No 31
I0E0 0.44 20 15 1 3 0 70 2 4 1.63E+09 0 0 0 No Yes No 48
I0E0 0.44 20 15 1 3 0 70 2 5 64128166 0 0 0 No Yes No 55
I0E0 0.44 20 15 1 3 0 70 2 6 1.56E+09 0 0 0 No Yes No 57
I0E0 0.44 20 15 1 3 0 70 2 7 -5.7E+08 0 0 0 No Yes No 36
I0E0 0.44 20 15 1 3 0 70 2 8 5.87E+08 0 0 0 No Yes No 37
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then imported into JMP. A histogram of “Red Reach Goal” across all 411,200 runs is 
given in Figure 20. 
 
Figure 20.  Overall Distribution of “Red Achieves its Goal.” 
The overall distribution of Red success indicates that Red forces were successful 
approximately 59% of the time and Blue was able to stop Red 41% of the time. The 
estimated standard error associated with 411,200 samples of independent Bernoulli 
random variables with a success probability of .59 is 0.00077. However, it should be 
noted that this histogram was obtained across all of simulated attacks and all of the input 
combinations. We can view this histogram by one or more factor combinations. In Figure 
21 we examine the histogram by the number of Red boats, one on the left and two on the 
right. 
 
Figure 21.  Distribution of “Red Achieves its Goal” versus 
Number of Red Boats. 
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From Figure 21, we can see that in the situations in which there were two Red 
boats, Red is able to achieve its goal 63% of time, as compared to 54% of time when the 
attack was carried out using one Red boat. The estimated standard error associated with 
samples of data when there is one red boat is 0.0011 and when there are two Red boats is 
0.00105. That is, over all the input combinations, if Red attacks using two boats, then 
Blue has 9% less chance of being successful in stopping the terrorist attack. The bar chart 
in Figure 22 illustrates the comparison of success rate for Blue.  
Figure 22.  Success Rate for Blue Sentries by Number of Red Boats. 
B. INFLUENTIAL FACTORS IN MODEL 
One of our goals is to identify the most influential experiment factors, in order to 
gain some insight into improving the effectiveness of the Blue force against a terrorist 
boat attack. One method for exploring the relationship between the response and the 
experiment factors is the partition tree.  
1. Partition Tree
A partition tree is a useful, nonparametric technique used to explore the effect of 
multiple factors on an output measure. The output can be categorical or continuous. 
Partition trees, being nonparametric, do not make any assumptions about the distributions 
of the underlying data. They additionally have the nice features of being able to easily 
handle large data sets, as well as provide a result that is deemed by many non-technically 
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trained decision makers as both intuitive and interpretable. JMP statistical discovery 
software defines partition trees as: 
The partition platform recursively partitions data according to a 
relationship between the X and Y values, creating a tree of partitions. It 
finds a set of cuts or groupings of X values that best predict a Y value. It 
does this by exhaustively searching all possible cuts or groupings. These 
splits (or partitions) of the data are done recursively forming a tree of 
decision rules until the desired fit is reached. This is a powerful platform, 
because it chooses the optimum splits from a large number of possible 
splits. (“Partition Models,” n.d.) 
The result of applying the partition tree technique to our data is given in Figure 
23. The response is Red’s ability to achieve its goal.
Figure 23.  Partition Tree Indicating Critical Factors of the Model. 
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The response variable selected for partition is “Red achieves its Goal,” and all 
input factors were fed to the model. The goal of the analysis is to determine which factors 
have the maximum impact on the response variable. We see that the first split occurs on 
number of hits on Red boat to kill, which makes it an important factor. Red boats hits to 
kill are defined as the number of shots fired by Blue agents to neutralize Red boat. This 
depends on the lethality of Blue weapons and the staying power of Red. Since Blue 
cannot control the staying power of Red, Blue weapon lethality has the most significant 
effect of the controllable factors on the ability to stop a terrorist attack. The next split, in 
each group, further defines the next most important factor in each respective group. In the 
split performed on the “Red Hits to Kill < 13” category on the right, we see again that we 
split on Red boat hits to kill. This suggests a nonlinear relationship between the 
probability of Red success and number of shots fired by Blue to neutralize Red boats—
and that this single factor dominates. In subsequent splits, the probability of hit by Blue 
sentries plays an important factor. Probability of hit is the probability that Blue sentries 
will hit the Red boat per shot. So we can conclude that lethality followed by probability 
of hit of Blue weapons (i.e., accuracy) are the two most critical factors in defeating Red 
suicide boat attacks.  
2. Analysis of Summarized Data 
An alternative to analyzing the full data set with 411,200 rows, is to summarize 
each of the 4,112 designs points by their mean and standard deviation. We then look to fit 
metamodels to the means of the design points, in order to achieve higher R-square values. 
For this approach, two new binary columns were created. The “Red Reaches Goal” 
column was originally in the form of “Yes” and “No,” and this was converted to binary 
numerical form, where one indicates “Yes” and zero indicates “No.” The complement of 
this column is “Blue success,” which was also converted to a numerical binary form. A 




Figure 24.  Data Sheet Generated after Creation of Two New Columns in 
Binary Form. 
For each of the 4,112 design points, the sample mean and standard deviation of 
Red success and Blue success were calculated. This gives us 4,112 estimates of the 
probability of Red and Blue success, an estimate for each of the design’s input 
combinations. A snapshot of the new data file generated is shown in Figure 25. 
 
Figure 25.  Data Sheet Created after Collapsing (Summarizing) Data. 
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Histograms and summary statistics for Mean(Red Success) and Mean(Blue 
Success) are given in Figure 26. Note that the histograms are reflections of each other. 
That is, if Red is successful, then Blue is not. It is worth noting that Red’s empirical 
probability of success ranges from zero to one over the 4,112 design points. So, we have 
induced a good deal of variability with our experiment, useful for evaluating the impact 
of the factors. 
 
Figure 26.  Histograms and Summary Statistics for Mean Blue and Red 
Success. 
We can see that after collapsing the data, we obtain a partition tree very similar to 
the one produced using the full data set. The insights as to the critical factors and breaks 




Figure 27.  Partition Tree of Collapsed Data for Red Success. 
The partition tree indicates that Red boat hits to kill (i.e., Blue lethality and Red 
staying power) is again the most important factor. While the most critical factor obtained 
by the partition tree after collapsing the data against design points was the same, the “Red 
boats hit to kill” split is now reduced from 13 to 11—and we get a much better R square 
value, i.e., 0.651 after 5 splits against 0.355 in the previous case.  It is also worth noting 




C. LOGISTIC FIT OF DATA 
In order to check the individual effects of input factors on the probability of Red 
success, a logistic regression fit for all input factors, one at a time, was carried out. Since 
this approach does not consider interactions between the input factors, we complement 
this technique with use of stepwise regression in the next section. Figure 28 shows the 
logistic fit of the different input factors against the response.  
 
Figure 28.  Logistic Fit of the Response against Different Input Variables. 
Here we can see that most variation comes from “Red boats hit to kill” or number 
of shots fired by Blue to kill Red boat and probability of hit by Blue weapons. While not 
as significant, we also see that Blue does better with more sentries and a patrol boat. Red 
does better with two boats and greater attack speed. Weapon cases two and three were 
associated with higher Red success, as compared to the other weapon cases. Although, 
some labels in Figure 28 are not clearly visible, they appear clear in subsequent figures. 
Figure 29 gives the whole model test for a logistic fit of Red Reaches Goal by probability 
of hit of Blue weapons and number of Blue patrol boats. 
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Figure 29.  Logistic Fit of Red Success by Probability of Hit and Number 
of Blue Patrol Boats. 
Here we can see that the probability of hit and number of Blue patrol boats are both 
significant factors as indicated by their respective p-values. The observation is consistent 
with our previous findings. The logistic fit graphs show that probability of hit is more 
impactful on the outcome than number of blue boats. This finding is also evident from the 
R-square values, where bigger R-square values imply that the corresponding factor 
explains more of the variability in the outcome. From Figure 29, we observe that R-
square values are low, but we have to keep in mind that these are one factor at a time fits 
(while the other factors are changing in the “background”). The whole model test of 
logistic fit for Red success against Red boat speed and shots required by Blue to 
neutralize Red boats is given in Figure 30. 
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Figure 30.  Logistic Fit of Red Success by Red Boat Speed and Red Boat 
Hits to Kill. 
Here we can clearly see that most prominent factor, which has the biggest effect 
on output, is Red boats hit to kill, i.e., the lethality of Blue weapons against the target—as 
it causes the biggest change. The p-value also indicates its significance, and we can also 
see that it has an R-square value of 0.3013, far bigger than other input factors. The other 
factor, Red boats speed is also significant, as indicated by the p-value, but it has a low R-
square value, indicating that it has a lower effect on Red success as compared to lethality 
of Blue weapons. The logistic fit for weapon configuration case and number of Blue 




Figure 31.  Logistic Fit of Red Success by Weapon Case and Number of 
Blue Sentries. 
The p-values of both factors indicate these are significant factors. In the case of 
logistic fit of Red success by number of Blue sentries, we do not observe much change. 
In the weapon case, we see that all weapon cases have approximately the same effect on 
Red success except for weapon cases two and three. Weapon cases two and three have 
two weapons only, as compared to three weapons by Blue sentries in all other cases, so 
this result makes sense. Two weapons reduces the number of shots received by Red, 
hence increasing the probability of Red success. Now the question is, why do all other 
weapons have the same effect on Red success, despite these weapons cases corresponds 
to different weapons combination with Blue sentries? After further analysis it was 
revealed that this is a limitation of our model. In an actual scenario, the type of weapons 
of Blue sentries determines the number of shots Red takes before it sinks, but in our 
model we have defined hits to kill as a separate input factor. In MANA we cannot 
directly define that when a sentry is using a particular type of weapon, then the Red boat 
will have a particular staying power. Therefore, weapon case is not significant in defining 
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the staying power of Red boat, but it is important for determining the combined rate of 
fire (ROF) by Blue sentries. The logistic fit of Red success for exclusion zone distance 
and number of attacking Red boats is given in Figure 32. 
 
Figure 32.  Logistic Fit of Red Success by Exclusion Zone Distance and 
Number of Red Boats. 
We see that both factors have very low p-values, thereby indicating that these are 
significant factors. The number of Red boats has an intuitive effect on the outcome, 
although not very pronounced. Out of these factors, we see that the exclusion zone 
distance also has minimal effect, which is counter intuitive, so this aspect was further 
explored by keeping all other factors as constant and running the MANA simulation for 
different exclusion zone distances. 
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D. EXPLORING THE EFFECT OF EXCLUSION ZONE DISTANCE ON 
RED SUCCESS 
Sometimes during an exploration of complicated simulations with many variables, 
the effects of one or more factors are masked by other dominant factors. In order to 
explore whether exclusion zone distance was dominated by other factors, we did a one 
factor experiment on our scenario while keeping all the other factors constant. In the 
basic scenario file of MANA, all input factors were fixed except the factor, “Exclusion 
Zone Distance,” as shown in Table 7. 
Table 7.   Factors Used in Scenario for Exploring the Effect of Exclusion 
Zone Distance on Red Success. 
No Input Factor Fixed Value in Scenario 
1. Probability of Hit 0.4 
2. Red Boat Speed 15 
3. Weapon Case 8 
4. Number of Blue Sentries 3 
5. Number of Red Boats 2 
6. Number of Blue Patrol Boat 1 
7. Red Boat Hit to Kill (Staying Power) 25 
8. Exclusion Zone Distance Varied for Exploration  
 
After fixing the input factors as per Table 7, hundred simulations were run for 
each scenario and the data was obtained. The output result of each simulation was placed 




Table 8.   Mean Probability of Red Success against Exclusion Zone Distance 









1 40 0.31 0.046249 
2 50 0.13 0.03363 
3 60 0.05 0.021794 
4 70 0.03 0.017059 
5 80 0.02 0.014 
6 90 0.01 0.00995 
 
Table 8 is displayed graphically in Figure 33. 
 
Figure 33.  Probability of Red Success against Varying 
Exclusion Zone Distance. 
It can be seen that, as exclusion zone distance increases from 40 to 60 meters the 
probability of Red success decreases sharply, but after 60 meters there is not much 
difference. The knee of curve lies at about 60 meters, indicating that a 60 meter exclusion 
zone may be taken as an acceptable distance to protect the Blue ship.  
E. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Out of many important applications of statistics, one is regression analysis. It is 
the process of estimating (predicting) the mean value of a response variable y, based on 
knowledge of related independent variables x (Mendenhall & Sincich, 2007). When we 
perform regression analysis, there may be a large number of potentially important 
independent variables, with associated main effects and interactions. A popular objective 
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method of building a parsimonious model with only the most important independent 
variables and building a model is called stepwise regression analysis (Mendenhall & 
Sincich, 2007).  
It is important to note that with binary responses the basic assumptions for linear 
regression are not met. Specifically, the errors will not be normally distributed with a 
constant variance. Moreover, the response must be restricted to between zero and one, 
while the regression equation may make predictions outside of this region at the 
extremes. However, we are using the regression for descriptive purposes, i.e., to provide 
insight into the relationship between the input factors and our response (Kleijnen et al. 
2005). Ideally, we will produce readily interpretable relationships between the input 
variables and the response. As noted by Hellevik (2009), “the intuitively meaningful 
interpretation [of linear regression] makes it easier to communicate research results [than 
logistic regression].” Of course, since the errors are not normally distributed, or even 
continuous, the p-values do not have a precise interpretation. Nonetheless, the p-values 
are functions of the sums of squares explained by the variables, and smaller p-values 
indicate more significance for the terms.  
While not optimal in terms of power, the regression coefficient estimates are 
unbiased. Furthermore, given our large sample and high R-square value, optimal power is 
not a critical issue. For more discussion on this common practice, see Hellevik (2009). 
Stepwise regression was performed on the data collapsed across design points to 
explore the relationships between different input factors on the probability of Red 
success. The response variable is the probability of Red boat survival. The purpose of 
regression is to find a mathematical model that estimates the success rate of Blue or Red 




Figure 34.  Regression Model with All Input Factors. 
The R square and adjusted R square values are very high, indicating that the 
regression model is capturing over 80% of the variability of the simulation model. The 
maximum value of t ratio is 111.32, for hits to kill Red boats. A large t-ratio indicates the 
significance of the corresponding factor—though the lack of normality of the residuals 
means that these values should not be intercepted in the usual sense. Our regression 
confirms our earlier finding that shots required to neutralize Red boats is the most 
important factor. From the regression model above, we can also see the consistency of the 
second most important factor being the probability of hit (with a −44.59 t ratio). The 
negative sign associated with t ratio indicates that there is a negative correlation between 
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that factor and the output response. That is, as the probability of hit increases, the 
probability of Red success decreases. The prediction profiler plots show the marginal 
effects of each factor on the probability of Red success. It is worth noting that the main 
effects are more significant than the interactions. 
Figure 35 displays the actual by predicted plot. It can be seen that predicted 
values are generally consistent with actual values, indicating the effectiveness of the 
model. It should be noted that the residuals are not normal, thus the p-values are not 
precise.  
 
Figure 35.  Actual by Predicted Plot of Mean (Red Success). 
F. SIGNIFICANT INTERACTIONS 
An interaction measures the change in response (Red reaches goal) caused by 
varying one input factor that is dependent on the value of another input factor. In this 
model, there are eight different inputs and all may potentially have interactions between 
them. In order to examine the interactions between different factors, an interaction profile 
plot was generated and examined to look for significant interactions between input 
factors. The interaction plot in Figure 36 shows the high and low levels of all pairs of 
factors, and the effect on the response. By observing the near parallel lines in the graphs, 
we see that the interactions are not that strong. Some interesting interactions are (1) the 
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probability of Red success drops faster with probability of Blue shots hitting Red, when 
the exclusion zone is greater and (2) the probability of Red success drops faster with 
probability of Blue shots hitting Red, when there are three sentries as opposed to two. 
 
Figure 36.  Interaction Profiler. 
G. TACTICS WITHIN EXCLUSION ZONE 
If sentries see an incoming boat heading towards a ship inside the exclusion zone, 
should the sentries fire a warning shot and then disabling shots, or they should directly 
fire disabling shots? A ship’s crew is always concerned about what to do in this situation. 
Although we did not carry out simulation for this scenario, the situation was analyzed 
 56 
using the results of previous simulation runs (with an exclusion zone distance of 60 
meters) and simple mathematics calculations involving time and distance. We have found 
in our analysis that, with the given parameters, 60 meters is an adequate exclusion zone 
distance, which must be maintained to have an acceptable level of defense by the Blue 
ship. A boat traveling at 15 knots will cover 7.5 meters each second. If a sentry fires a 
warning shot, observes its effect on the incoming boat and then fires disabling shots, it 
may take six to eight seconds and at best it will take three to four seconds. A boat moving 
at 15 knots will take only eight seconds to cross the exclusion zone and hit the ship’s 
side. If sentries are very alert and good at observing the effect of a warning shot, even 
then there will be only about five seconds available for the sentries to disable the 
attacking boat. It will be the same as if exclusion zone is now established at 38 to 40 
meters. After incorporating the delay of three to four seconds in opening up disabling 
fire, the overall distribution of Red achieves its goal is depicted in Figure 33.   
 
Figure 37.  Distribution of Red Success after Incorporating a Three- to 
Four-Second Delay. 
We can see that incorporating a delay of three to four seconds results in the 
probability of Red success increasing from 6% to 32%, indicating that a warning shot 
may not be a good idea if the exclusion zone is of only 60 meters or less in width. Thus, 
the Blue patrol boat should be tasked with implementing the exclusion zone effectively. 
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VI. CONCLUSION
The main purpose of this study was to analyze the protection measures that might 
be employed by a ship’s crew against a suicide terrorist boat. To that end, 4,112 design 
points were generated for simulation. Each design point represents a set of input factors 
that generates the output, i.e., whether Red achieves its goal or not. Each design point 
was replicated 100 times in order to explore a range of possible results from the 
stochastic model. This study analyzes the data obtained by performing 411,200 simulated 
attacks on a Blue ship by Red boats. Analysis techniques used to explore the resultant 
data include histograms, partition trees, logistic fits of Red success against all input 
factors, and stepwise regression. In order to further explore the exclusion zone distance 
effect on Red success, a one factor experiment was also performed. 
A. CRITICAL FACTORS IN MODEL 
After analyzing the data, the following important insights were discovered: 
• The most important factor is the number of Blue shots needed to kill the
Red boat (neutralize)—that is, the lethality of Blue weapons against the
threat. Further, an important threshold value for this factor was 11. In
other words, there was a clear difference in the estimate of Red success
when hits required to neutralize Red boat were less than eleven or more
than eleven. All analysis techniques recommended that lethality of Blue
weapons is the most critical factor. This is because, in such a situation,
time is very important. Sentries will have 6-12 seconds, depending on the
speed of the Red boat and the exclusion zone distance. So, the more lethal
the Blue weapons are, the greater the chances are of stopping a Red boat
attack.
• Another important factor is the probability of hit by Blue Sentries. In such
situations, probability of hit by Blue sentries will largely depend on their
weapons, environmental factors, confidence, fear factor and their resolve
to stop the attack. Out of these factors, confidence, control of fear, and
resolve of sentries to stop a Red boat, can be improved by better training
of Blue sentries.
• Exclusion zone distance also plays an important role. At least a 60 meter
exclusion zone is recommended, but it will depend on input factors,
especially hits required to neutralize Red boat. It is very important to
58 
know how many rounds of a particular weapon are required to neutralize 
the attacking boat. 
• The presence of a Blue patrol boat also reduces the chances of Red
success, but is not a dominant factor. However, a Blue patrol boat is vital
for implementing the exclusion zone.
• At whatever distance the exclusion zone is established, it must be
implemented effectively by a Blue patrol boat. There will be a manifold
increase in the probability of Red success if the tactic of firing a warning
shot followed by disabling shot is adopted.
B. FOLLOW-ON WORK 
We recommend the following potential areas for future research: 
• The standard deviations of weapons in the x and y axis was not available,
so for the purpose of this study, values for standard deviation were
assumed, based on experience. Theoretical probability of hit of all
weapons can be calculated by using actual standard deviations based on
live fire tests. Additionally, in-field calculation of probability of hit by
Blue sentries can be carried out in near actual conditions.
• No data was available on the actual effectiveness of particular types of
weapons in terms of how many rounds are required to neutralize an
attacking Red boat. Collection of this data would therefore be useful to
refine the scenario.
• A useful scenario variant to consider is if a Red boat also starts firing on
the Blue ship, while attacking. In our scenario, this was not the case.
• It would also be useful to study the case of a Blue ship coming under 
attack from the sea as well as from the land—what tactics and protection 
measures are required?
• Allow friendly boats to also enter the exclusion zone.
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